With the Hedgehog or the Fox? by McCarty, Willard








Narratology, Digital Humanities and Beyond 
 
 
Marie Flüh, Jan Horstmann, Janina Jacke, Mareike 
Schumacher (Eds.) 




BIBLIOGRAFISCHE INFORMATION DER DEUTSCHEN NATIONALBIBLIOTHEK 
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; 
detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über https://portal.dnb.de abrufbar. 
LIZENZ 
Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Das Werk steht unter der 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz Namensnennung 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0, https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.de). Ausgenommen von der oben genannten Lizenz sind Abbildungen und 
sonstiges Drittmaterial. 
ONLINE-AUSGABE 
Die Online-Ausgabe dieses Werkes ist eine Open-Access-Publikation und ist auf den Verlagswebseiten 
frei verfügbar. Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek hat die Online-Ausgabe archiviert. Diese ist dauerhaft 
auf dem Archivserver der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek (https://portal.dnb.de) verfügbar. 
DOI https://doi.org/10.15460/HUP.209 
 





Alegreya. Copyright 2011: The Alegreya Project Authors 
(https://github.com/huertatipografica/Alegreya). This Font Software is licensed under the SIL Open 
Font License, Version 1.1. This license is also available with a FAQ at: http://scripts.sil.org/OFL 
DRUCK UND BINDUNG 
Books on Demand – BoD, Norderstedt 
VERLAG 
Hamburg University Press, Verlag der Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky, 
Hamburg (Deutschland), 2021 
http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de
 
T abl e of  C on te nts  
Preface 9 
Introduction: Undogmatic Reading – from Narratology to Digital 
Humanities and Back 11 
Marie Flüh, Jan Horstmann, Janina Jacke, Mareike Schumacher   
Narrative Motivierung 31 
Wolf Schmid  
Erzählen vom Selbst als Bewusstsein, ein Versuch zur Weltbewältigung 45 
La débil mental (2014) von Ariana Harwicz  
Inke Gunia  
An “Undogmatic” Reading of Lyric Poetry 63 
Defending the Narratological Approach to Poetry Analysis  
Peter Hühn  
With the Hedgehog or the Fox? 73 
Willard McCarty  
Über Metaphern 81 
und die Voraussetzungen für ihre Verwendung in der 
Informationstechnologie  
Manfred Thaller  
Creating Historical Identity with Data 103 
A Digital Prosopography Perspective  
John Bradley  
Algorithmen zwischen Strukturalismus und Postcolonial Studies 121 
Zur Kritik und Entwicklung der computationellen Literaturwissenschaft  
Evelyn Gius  
 
Cesare Beccaria’s Dei Delitti e delle pene (1764) 133 
Approaching the Multilingual Textual and Paratextual Tradition from an 
(Undogmatic) Digital Point of View  
Claudine Moulin, Christof Schöch  
Lässt sich die Grenze zwischen Realismus und Früher Moderne empirisch 
bestimmen? 145 
Ergebnisse und Fragen eines Eye-Tracking-Experiments mit zwei 
Brunnengedichten von C.F. Meyer und R.M. Rilke  
Thomas Weitin, A. Vanessa Möschner  







Wi th the H edgehog or the Fox?  
Willard McCarty  
1  A v o i d i n g  t h e  e x t r e m e s  
In his essay on Tolstoy as historian, Isaiah Berlin looked to a dark saying by the an-
cient Greek poet Archilochus to open up the mind of his subject: “The fox knows 
many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing”, πόλλ’ οἶδ’ ἀλώπηξ ἀλλ’ ἐχῖνος ἓν 
μέγα (Berlin, 2013 [1953], p. 1). Berlin acknowledged that no clean division is possible 
but argued that this one “offers a point of view from which to look and compare, a 
starting-point for genuine investigation” (p. 3). The trick in general is neither to dis-
miss nor to take on dichotomies of this (or any sort) uncritically but to pursue what 
lies between. Thus, in his essay Anti anti-relativism, anthropologist Clifford Geertz set 
out to locate a truth between views that strict polarisation had drained of the truths 
that had launched them (Geertz, 1984). 
The view I want to recommend here,1 in celebration of Jan Christoph Meister’s 
scholarly life, is somewhat the same in reverse: ferociously to embrace a foxy nature, 
knowing many things, but never to lose sight of the hedgehog’s vision of that “one 
big thing”. These days, the Web makes knowing many things perhaps easier than 
ever before. The Web is, I suspect, not a cause of our foxy-mindedness, rather an 
expression of an overall drive to plurality and diversity with many contributing fac-
tors.2 Many aspects of this drive are welcome indeed, and long overdue, but with 
radical change in intellectual fashions comes the moral imperative not to forget the 
genius of the fashion left behind. To my mind, remembering the truth of the hedge-
hog’s way is the problem now; foxiness is everywhere and at least for now can take 
                                                                          
1
 Straying across languages and cultures, from Anglo-North American to German, as I do here, necessitates 
this apology for inadequate recognition and use of scholarship in that other tradition. I trust omissions and 
corrections will happen in the mind of the reader. 
2
 It is, I suspect, neither pure coincidence nor causal relation that Tim Berners-Lee’s proposal of what became 
the Web (March 1989) and its public release (on alt.hypertext, 7 August 1991) coincided rather closely with 
the fall of the Berlin Wall (9 November 1989) and dissolution of the Soviet Union by the signing of the 
Belavezha Accords (8 December 1991).
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care of itself. The point is to see what the world looks like once we escape polarisation 
of views, into only what the fox sees or only the hedgehog. At both extremes is essen-
tially the same Foucauldian panopticon (McCarty, 2019b, p. 155). 
2  A  b r i e f  a u t o - e t h n o g r a p h i c  v i g n e t t e  
The cat(ma)-and-dog(ma) fight humorously and playfully alluded to in the work of 
Jan Christoph and colleagues at Hamburg is waged of course in the realm of text-
analysis and centres on metatextual encoding. My own view on this subject was 
formed from my attempt from ca. 1984 to 1998 to see what would happen if one were 
to set out rigorously to encode a challenging poetic text for its meaning-making com-
ponents – to think insofar as possible with the mind of a machine.3 By ‘rigorously’ I 
mean unwaveringly faithful to the imperative of absolutely consistent and com-
pletely explicit representation of these components. Setting that course brought me 
into stark, often psychically and morally painful collision with the inherent incon-
sistencies and allusiveness of language as we find it. This collision taught me a great 
deal about the poetry I chose, Ovid’s Metamorphoses, whose relentless ambiguity 
made it ideal for my purposes. Hence the learning I gained from my attempts to pin 
it down was negative, that is, it proceeded by way of a powerful via negativa which 
illumined what I saw, or thought I saw, but was not able encode without violating 
that imperative. Adhering to it, I had to conclude that apart from taking notes on a 
text or editing, indexing and formatting texts, markup in principle has only this via 
negativa to offer the interpreter. Yes, I was being dogmatic, but I wanted to see close 
up where the dogma of algorithmic rigour would lead me, what it would expose to 
view. What I missed at the time was the active, positive role of markup in defamil-
iarising the poetry. More on that later. 
At about the same time, at a Symposium on Unintended Nuclear Warfare in Bu-
dapest, computer scientist Brian Cantwell Smith took the next step by explaining 
why in principle no computing system, no matter how sophisticated, could ever be 
absolutely correct (1985). The near-miss on 5 October 1960, when the American Early-
Warning System falsely identified the rising moon as “a large contingent of Soviet 
missiles” heading its way, was his wake-up call. But for my purposes here his im-
portant contribution was to foreground the problematic relation between a compu-
tational model and the thing as modelled under the interpretation of the modeller. 
When it came time for me to theorise the subject about 20 years later, I realised that 
a focus on any particular model, that is, on the referent of the noun ‘model’, singular 
or plural, was the wrong way to go about understanding what the digital machine 
                                                                          
3
 The account here is based on McCarty, 2017. 
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could do and was doing reciprocally with all of us (McCarty, 2014 [2005], pp. 20–53). 
We required, I argued, not the noun but the verbal form, the gerundive/participle 
‘modelling’, and needed to start talking seriously about the modelling relation. In Dig-
ital Humanities, at least in the Anglophone world, serious talk about it began to hap-
pen in the first decade of this century. 
What began then for the Geisteswissenschaften was a crucial recognition of the 
process not just the product of digitally enabled scholarship. Modelling rendered 
that product in principle unstable or temporary. Philosophically, that is, computing 
these sciences brought with it a shift from thinking in terms of ontology (Quine’s On 
what there is, 1948) to practices of ontologising. But saying this raises questions: at 
what do these practices aim? How do we regard what they achieve? Quine would say 
they are approximations of the ontology, about which we can never agree; Simon (and 
many computer scientists after him) that the aim is ‘satisficing’, i. e. achieving the 
good-enough for whatever purpose; Goodman that ontology in Quine’s sense “is ev-
anescent, and no one account of it will do”.4 Ontologising can transgress somewhat 
metaphor does in Goodman’s description, “drawing significant boundaries that cut 
across ruts worn by habit” (Goodman, 1984, p. 73). In the history of the digital ma-
chine this happened very early, as designers of the ontologising machine “bit by bit 
(byte by byte) deconstructed the notion of a tool itself as [it] came to stand not for a 
tool, but for nature itself” (Galison, 1996, p. 157). And so, Keller writes, in biology we 
come to realise that, 
the question ‘What is life?’ is a historical question, answerable only in terms of the cate-
gories by which we as human actors choose to abide, the differences that we as human 
actors chose to honor, and not in either logical, scientific, or technical terms. It is in this 
sense that the category of life is a human rather than a natural kind. Not unlike explana-
tion. (Keller, 2002, p. 294) 
Not unlike the temporary state in a modelling exercise. 
My own next step was, you might say, implicit in what I have just said: the result 
of asking what happens when modelling is turned loose, when the goal is not to ap-
proximate something known (‘modelling of’) or to converge on something specific 
(‘modelling for’) but computationally “to imagine what you don’t know”, that is, to sim-
ulate the possible.5 Thinking like this, as I did, leads to the conviction that our machine 
is fully realised when it becomes a device of the imagination, not an information-vend-
ing appliance or means of social intercourse (though both of these are quite important). 
                                                                          
4
 On ontology in Quine and subsequently in computer science, see McCarty, 2019b, pp. 149–151; on satisficing, 
Simon, 1956, p. 136 and Feigenbaum, 2001; Goodman, 1984, pp. 73, 130. 
5
 McCarty, 2019a; McGann, 2001, p. 82. 
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3  M i m e s i s  t o  a l t e r i t y  
I’ve described my own path of research over the last 35 years to lay groundwork for 
questioning where we go from here: fox-like, in the spirit of the age, to look into many 
things, but I would like to suggest one big thing in order to honour the hedgehog. 
Whatever its lineaments, this one big thing must have been implicit in the past, so I 
begin there, borrowing from economic historian and philosopher Philip Mirowski’s 
portrait of his discipline in its 20th-century transition, Machine Dreams: Economics be-
comes a Cyborg Science. Mirowski uses Steven Millhauser’s story, The New Automaton The-
atre (1999), as précis of his own. It serves the same purpose here for my proposal of the 
intellectual matrix I think is most important for our disciplinary future. 
Millhauser tells of a small German city whose social life orbits staged perfor-
mances of miniature, artfully crafted automata made by a small group of master 
craftsmen, who generation after generation train apprentices to succeed them. From 
childhood to old age the citizens are utterly devoted to “these little creatures”. Over 
time, advances in clockwork ensure “an ever-increasing mastery of the illusion of life” 
and more gripping exploration of it. One extraordinarily gifted apprentice, Heinrich 
Graum, rises to mastery like none other, lifts the mimetic art to new heights “with the 
revelation of ever-new spiritual depths, and making us yearn for darker and deeper 
beauties. It was as if his creatures strained at the very limits of the human, without 
leaving the human altogether”. Then without explanation Graum falls utterly silent and 
unproductive for ten years. On his return, he startles and shocks the citizens with a 
performance “like a knife flashed in the face of our art”. In the Neues Zaubertheater, 
we are asked to share the emotions of automatons themselves. The clockwork artifice, far 
from being disguised, is thrust upon our attention... Graum’s new automatons suffer and 
struggle; no less than the old automatons do they appear to have souls. But they do not have 
the souls of human beings; they have the souls of clockwork creatures, grown conscious of 
themselves. They are the race of automatons, the clan of clockwork; they are new beings, in-
serted into the universe by the mind of Graum the creator. They live lives that are parallel to 
ours but are not to be confused with ours... And the new automatons begin to obsess us. They 
penetrate our minds, they multiply within us, they inhabit our dreams. They waken in us new, 
forbidden passions we cannot name. (Millhauser, 1999, pp. 93–95) 
We must not let the latter part of Millhauser’s tale, generically familiar to us from all 
the clatter about AI, obscure what comes before; we must keep the whole story before 
us. What matters is the story of transition to alterity, from a tour de force profoundly 
imitating the human to the stark realisation of automata in their own terms. Through 
his notion of the “uncanny valley”, Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori hinted some 
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years ago at the existential lessons to be learned (Mori, 2012 [1970]; Kageki, 2012). 
More recently, implications of the same have arisen in successes of the AlphaGo Zero 
system at the ancient game of Go, winning through moves previously unknown in 
the millennia-long history of the game (McCarty, 2019b, p. 154). Ongoing ethno-
graphic and ethnological studies of AI systems are looking into the native character-
istics of AI systems (e. g. Rahwan et al., 2019; Wang, 2016). 
The foxy-minded reader will already be aware of the pluralisation of ‘intelli-
gence’ by ethologists and plant biologists, preceded by work on the multiplicity of 
kinds in humans against the century-long attempts to nail intelligence down, e. g. 
by means of psychometric research.6 To this we must add the work of many anthro-
pologists, historians and comparatists demonstrating the falsity of benchmarking 
intelligence, e. g. by the inclination to count and ability to perform abstract numer-
ical calculations.7 Again, a most welcome diversification, to which studies of AI are 
beginning to contribute.  
4  “ T h e  o n e  b i g  t h i n g ” ?  
I want to replace the hedgehog’s one big thing, in its pure, uncompromising obses-
sion, by the tendency of mind to long for closure but to refrain from closing down 
the many possibilities that frustrate it. This may seem a foxy way to think midway 
between fox and hedgehog, but what I am suggesting is a hedgehogian corrective to 
the fox’s undirected curiosity: corrective to the fox’s pure seeing of differences with-
out comparing the different things. I am suggesting a Keatsian “negative capabil-
ity”,8 which does not resolve the enigmatic into knowledge but leaves it to have its 
effects on us. I am suggesting the inconcluding and indeterminating power of mind 
that Viktor Shklovsky found in works that estrange the known, sometimes with 
crude language or jarring scenes (as the digital does to poetry), 
that one may recover the sensation of life… The purpose of art is to impart the sensation 
of things as they are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make 
objects “unfamiliar”, to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of per-
ception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself. (Shklovsky, 1965 
[1919], p. 12–13; cf. Berlina, 2016) 
                                                                          
6
 For ethology, see McCarty, 2019b, p. 149; for plant biology, Mancuso & Viola, 2015 [2013]; for varieties of hu-
man intelligence (and commentary on the psychometric work), Gardner, 2011 [1983]. 
7
 Vilaça, 2018, and the commentaries on her lecture, Lloyd, 2018, and Verran, 2018. Cf. Lloyd & Vilaça, 2019. 
8
 Keats, letter to George and Tom Keats, 22 December 1817, in Scott, 1958, p. 60; see Ou, 2009. 
78 Willard McCarty 
 
Like Berlin, Shklovsky turns for an example to Tolstoy, who “makes the familiar seem 
strange by not naming the familiar object. He describes an object as if he were seeing 
it for the first time”. This is, for most mortals, impossible to sustain; no one could 
operate in daily life always seeing everything for the first time, not even a fox, who 
must recognise food, enemies, opportunities and so on. Drawing the foxy and the 
hedgehogian into the space between them and marrying these tendencies is, then, 
to create a perpetual state of tension. Thomas Kuhn wrote about it in The Essential 
Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research (1977/1959), forming the two 
forces into an historical rhythm of revolutionary change in physics. 
In computer science, public policy and other fields with unsolved but known 
problems, research is spurred on by ‘grand challenges’ (cf. Omenn, 2006). That is ob-
viously not what I have in mind. By and large, the solutions to grand challenges are 
expected to be what one expects, though perhaps not achieved by usual means. For 
often, at least in my experience, the motivating force or idea may be beyond one’s 
power to articulate or even suspect. Some, like me, follow their noses, then in retro-
spect see a path. In his meditation on several of his own close studies of laboratory 
notebooks, Investigative Pathways: Patters and Stages in the Careers of Experimental Scien-
tists, Holmes puts the matter just as I need it: the investigative pathway is not “a 
preexisting, well-traveled route that the investigator follows but […] one that she cre-
ates while exploring territory previously untraveled [suggesting] that one proceeds 
step by step, each step guided by those taken previously and by uncertain intimations 
about what lies ahead” (Holmes, 2004, p. xvi). The hedgehog’s mind is essential to 
keep from being lured too far into fascinating byways, many of them, in my experi-
ence, anything but irrelevant. The fox’s mind is equally essential to stay aware of 
them all, not canonising the one that you happen to be on but remaining open to the 
possibility that a byway, once cautiously explored, will turn out to be the highway. 
The opportunity to take in and become both creatures simultaneously, and to live 
the life they conflictingly make possible, is rare indeed, and not always realised. Surely 
Jan Christoph, though known for his catmatism, and so openly on the side of the fox, 
has assimilated the genius of the hedgehog and so will have no trouble staying imagi-
natively on track into the open fields offered by his richly deserved retirement. 
C o n t a c t  
Prof. Willard McCarty 
willard.mccarty@kcl.ac.uk 
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